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Systematic supervision procedures have been proposed to improve contingent valuation sur-
veying, particularly in developing countries. Surprisingly, the CV literature does not say much 
about the potential effects of supervision even though there is evidence of interviewer effects 
and social desirability issues that can bias results. This paper investigates the effects of inter-
view supervision on the valuation of public services, using split-sample treatments to include a 
test of scope of a nested good and to assess the effect of interview supervision on reported 
WTP. Results suggest that supervisors can be used to improve quality with no effect on WTP 
estimates.  
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Survey-based stated preference approaches, such 
as the contingent valuation (CV) method, have 
proved to be useful in providing input for policy 
and planning purposes when a good or service is 
not traded in a market setting (Freeman 2003). 
Applying CV techniques to value public services 
and natural resources is becoming more common 
in developing countries where information on lo-
cal preferences is scarce and consequently not 
included in the policy design process. Gunatilake 
et al. (2007) and Whittington (2002), however, 
point to the need to improve the quality of CV 
studies that are often poorly implemented, partic-
ularly in developing countries. Both Gunatilake et 
al. (2007) and Whittington (2002) provide a num-
ber of recommendations to enhance the quality of 
fieldwork in which they include implementing 
systematic supervision procedures. Field supervi-
sion entails assessing the quality of interviews, 
reviewing completed questionnaires before leav-
ing the location, and ensuring that the intended 
sample is interviewed. In addition, shirking be-
havior by the interviewer has been observed (in 
this and other studies) by falsifying information 
or sample locations (Whittingon 2002), further 
motivating a supervisory model. Moreover, Whit-
tington (2002) recommends supervision of inter-
views even if there is a language barrier between 
supervisor and interviewee, given that a lot can be 
learned from observing the body language of the 
interviewer and respondent. 
      Interview supervision, however, can be costly 
and counterproductive if respondents report dif-
ferent preferences in the presence of supervisors 
than they would report to the interviewer alone. 
Warren-Leubecker and Bohannon (1982), for in-
stance, show that respondents systematically vary 
their speech when a foreigner accomplice partic-
ipates as a listener in qualitative interviews. If re-
spondents misreport their preferences before for-
eigners, Whittington’s (2002) recommendation of 
using foreign supervisors would bias CV results. 
Surprisingly, the CV literature does not say much 
about the potential effects of supervising inter-
views even though there is evidence of interview-
er effects and social desirability issues that can 
bias the results (Laughland, Musser, and Musser 
1994, Legget et al. 2003, Loureiro and Lotade 
2005). 
      CV results are reported to be sensitive to the 
survey administration mode (List et al. 2004), 
characterized as social desirability and yea-saying 
issues. Laughland, Musser, and Musser (1994) 
define social desirability as basing responses on 
social norms rather than individual values and 
show that CV studies may be influenced by so-
cial desirability. Legget et al. (2003) found that 
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individuals report a higher willingness to pay 
(WTP) when the survey is implemented through 
in-person interviews, than when the survey is self 
administered. Marta-Pedroso. Freitas, and Dom-
ingos (2007) also found that in-person interviews 
produce higher WTP estimates compared to Web-
based surveys. This evidence suggests that the 
presence of an interviewer may increase the re-
ported WTP, consistent with social desirability 
bias. That is, respondents may misrepresent their 
true preferences and provide responses that they 
think will please the interviewer or that they be-
lieve to be consistent with societal norms (Legget 
et al. 2003). Based on this evidence, it may be 
expected that the presence of a supervisor in the 
interview may lead the respondent to provide an-
swers that please the supervisor (and interviewer) 
rather than basing their answers on individual 
values, hence upwardly biasing the results. 
   Respondents may also answer strategically ac-
cording to interviewer characteristics. For in-
stance, interviewer appearance can have an im-
pact on WTP, as shown by Bateman and Mawby 
(2004). They found that a more formal dress 
(business attire) is associated with higher WTP 
estimates in contrast to more casual clothing. 
Previous research has also found that respondents 
may be influenced by the gender of the interview-
er (e.g., Groves and Fultz 1985). Loureiro and 
Lotade (2005) find that WTP estimates are also 
associated with the race of the interviewer. Race-
of-interviewer effects have been found in tele-
phone interviews (Cotter, Cohen, and Coulter 
1982), as well as in virtual and live interviews 
(Krysan and Couper 2003). If racial differences 
exist between respondents and supervisors, the 
former can respond strategically and thus bias 
WTP estimates. In addition to appearance, racial 
differences can be identified in terms of language 
competence and accent. Expectations of the lan-
guage competence of supervisors can also affect 
the response of interviewees (Warren-Leubecker 
and Bohannon 1982). Hence, using foreigners to 
supervise the implementation of CV surveys, as 
suggested by Whittington (2002), may be coun-
terproductive.  
   This paper investigates the effect of interview 
supervision on CV outcomes in a developing 
country context. The CV method is used to elicit 
households’ willingness to pay for improved, reli-
able water services in León, Nicaragua. Split-
sample treatments were designed to include a test 
of scope of a nested good (i.e., with and without 
improvements of water quality) and to assess the 
effect of interview supervision on reported WTP. 
In-person interviews were conducted using a 
random sample of more than 600 geographically 
stratified households. Findings indicate that 
households would be willing to pay an increase of 
more than 56 percent in their monthly water bills 
for a reliable water system (i.e., no service inter-
ruptions), and an increase of almost 100 percent  
if water quality is also improved to be safe to 
drink. Results also suggest that supervisors can be 
used to improve the quality of CV studies in de-
veloping country contexts with no effect on WTP 
estimates.  
   The rest of the paper is organized as follows. 
The next section provides background details of 
the study location and water delivery systems in 
the area. Section three describes the survey design 
process for this particular study. Sections four and 
five provide the modeling theory and variable 
construction details. Section six presents the study 
results. The final section finishes with an impact 





León, Nicaragua, where our elicitation study was 
based, was the first capital city of Nicaragua after 
state independence in 1839; shortly afterwards, in 
1858, Managua was selected to hold the seat per-
manently. Located in the northwest quadrant of 
the country, it is the second largest city, with a 
total population of 174,051, many of whom 
(139,433) live in the urban center of the munic-
ipality as of the 2005 Census (INEC 2006a). León 
hosts the main campus of the country’s premier 
university, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de 
Nicaragua (UNAN), as well as strong and grow-
ing industrial, agricultural, and commercial sec-
tors. León boasts the highest literacy rates in the 
country, 92.9 percent as of 2007 (MINED 2008a), 
which is significantly higher than the national rate, 
86.5 percent (INEC 2006a). Yet León ranked only 
49 (out of 153) on a countrywide educational in-
dex that includes net enrollment, repetition, reten-
tion, and promotion rates (MINED 2008b). The 
Ministry of Health reports that the third most sig-
nificant reason for children aged 3-18 years old to 
miss school was illness, affecting 6.3 percent of 
the children, likely attributable, at least in part, to 186  August 2011                                                                                                         Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
 
water resources and consumption. The average 
number of years of schooling in 2007 in the De-
partment (State) of León was 5.04 years (MINED 
2008a).  
   The World Bank (2008) reports 36.9 percent of 
the population living under the poverty line in the 
city of León, with 7.1 percent in extreme poverty, 
which is below statewide rates of 49.4 percent 
and 13.1 percent, respectively. However, the a-
vailability of resources such as housing, water, 
and energy for residents of León is a mixed bag. 
Of the 39,895 homes within urban León, 31.9 per-
cent were assessed to be constructed with inade-
quate materials for flooring and/or walls (INEC 
2006b). Nevertheless, the majority of the popula-
tion of León has access to water from a private 
faucet on their property, reported to be 94.1 per-
cent in 2005, far higher than the national average 
of 80.3 percent (INEC 2006b).  
      Fifteen percent of Nicaragua’s surface area is 
water, with about 75 rivers, 32 lagoons, and 2 
lakes that cover 9,000 km
2 (Guevara Jerez 2007). 
Most of the tap water, however, comes from un-
derground water sources—an estimated 73 per-
cent to 90 percent, in fact. León in particular is 
endowed with the country’s largest underground 
aquifer, though water access is still a challenge in 
the arid season. The Pan American Health Organ-
ization (PAHO) and the Nicaraguan Company of 
Water and Sanitation (ENACAL) rank León first 
among municipalities prone to droughts (PAHO 
and ENACAL 2004). In addition, the León aqui-
fer is contaminated with high concentrations of 
agrochemical waste, as well as fecal coliform and 
bacteria (Guevara Jerez 2007, PAHO and 
ENACAL 2004). In reports assembled by the 
Ministry of Health in León (MINSA), the most 
prominent water-borne illnesses requiring hospi-
tal visits in 2008 were diarrhea/gastroenteritis 
(4,288 cases), intestinal parasites (3,736 cases), 
and giardiasis (1,470 cases) (MINSA 2008). 
These figures demonstrate that approximately 5.4 
percent of the population seeks treatment for wa-
ter-related illnesses. Throughout Nicaragua, other 
commonly reported illnesses related to water are 
typhoid fever, kidney failure, and chronic intox-
ication (Guevara Jerez 2007).  
      Three state institutions take responsibility for 
the provision of water services throughout the 
country: the Nicaraguan Institute of Water and 
Sanitation (INAA), the Social Investment Fund 
(FISE), and the Nicaraguan Company of Water 
and Sanitation (ENACAL). INAA is the regulator 
of water resources and is responsible for setting 
water tariffs and supervising the quality of water 
services. FISE aims at extending water infrastruc-
ture particularly to rural areas. ENACAL operates 
water and sanitation systems in urban areas. There 
exists a concentration of managerial, operational, 
and financial functions that diminish ENACAL’s 
capacity to maintain water infrastructure and 
provide reliable water services (PAHO and 
ENACAL 2004). Attempts to decentralize water 
services at the state level failed in five states, 
including León. Limited federal funding and lack 
of cost recovery have jeopardized ENACAL’s op-
erations persistently. In 2003, INAA fixed water 
tariffs below supply costs in response to political 
pressures (World Bank 2008). ENACAL has op-
erated in a financial deficit as a result, with a sig-
nificant debt for overdue electricity bills (Guevara 
Jerez 2007). Currently, the central government 
has to subsidize ENACAL to operate water sys-
tems and maintain water infrastructure.  
      As a result of poor system operation and in-
frastructure maintenance, interruptions of water 
services have become more common in recent 
years. Major losses of water occur due to dated 
and damaged pipelines. In an interview conducted 
by the research team with the Mayor of León on 
June 4, 2009, he reported that the water delivery 
system, composed of seven pumps, is over 50 
years old and that 30 percent of the water being 
extracted is lost before it reaches consumers, due 
to breaches in the piping and piping connections. 
The system seems to be unable to keep up with 
the demands of the rapidly growing population, 
which has more than doubled in the last decade. 
In addition, water treatment is limited to chlorina-
tion, and water quality is not tested on a regular 
basis. To cope with unreliable water services, 
consumers often purchase water from water ven-
dors (e.g., bottled water), which can be up to five 
times more expensive than official water tariffs in 
Nicaragua (World Bank 2008).  
 
Survey Design and Supervision Procedure 
 
The CV method is a nonmarket valuation tech-
nique suitable for collecting information about 
household preferences for improved public goods 
and services in developing countries (Whittington 
1998). This method requires careful survey de-
sign, choice of survey mode, and selection of a Franceschi and Vásquez                                                                          Do Supervisors Affect the Valuation of Public Goods?  187 
 
random sample to be effective in eliciting house-
hold preferences (Bateman et al. 2002, Whit-
tington 2002). In this study, the survey design 
follows an iterative approach based on a number 
of semi-structured interviews (with officials, ac-
tivists, and water users) and two focus groups of 
water users. In addition, a pilot survey was im-
plemented in the field by trained interviewers, 
with a random sample of 30 households.  
   The final version of the survey consisted of six 
sections. In the first section, respondents were 
asked to report their water uses and practices and 
to evaluate the current water system. In the sec-
ond section, respondents reported on their con-
sumption of bottled water, as households could 
reveal their preference regarding drinking water 
by consuming a substitute good for tap water (i.e., 
bottled water). Households were then asked in the 
third section about their expenditures on tap wa-
ter, bottled water, and water from other sources. 
The fourth section included the contingent scenar-
io, after which respondents were presented with a 
referendum valuation question where the total fee 
was randomly varied across the sample from 
C$100 to C$600 in increments of C$50 (the 
Cordoba is the national currency and was traded 
at about US$1:C$20 at the time of the survey in 
2009). The CV question was followed by ques-
tions about the level of certainty of the reported 
referendum response and the perceived conse-
quentiality of the survey. The fifth section of the 
survey asked about socio-demographic character-
istics. Finally, interviewers were asked to evalu-
ate the interview quality in the sixth section. 
      All respondents were presented with a basic 
good in the referendum, which consisted of pro-
viding tap water 24 hours per day, every day of 
the year. The experimental design also included 
four split-sample treatments (2x2), with variations 
in the water quality and in the supervision of the 
interview. This design allowed for a scope test for 
a nested good (Carson and Mitchell 1995). That 
is, in addition to the provision of uninterrupted 
water services, the quality of the water under the 
proposed system varied among respondents in 
two split-sample levels: (a) maintenance of cur-
rent water quality, and (b) provision of safe drink-
ing water. The design also varied in interview 
supervision: (a) unsupervised interview, and (b) 
supervised interview. Three undergraduate stu-
dents and three graduate students were previously 
trained to supervise the interviews. Four of the six 
supervisors were females. While the level of 
Spanish varied among supervisors, they were 
trained to introduce themselves to respondents in 
Spanish and were provided with corresponding 
identifications that differed from interviewers’ 
identification in title (interviewer vs. supervisor) 
and institution. Table 1 shows the number of 
household responses obtained for each split sam-
ple treatment in the experimental design.  
   Households were randomly selected according 
to a stratified random sampling strategy. Urban 
León was stratified into eight geographical zones. 
Then, parcels in each stratum were selected from 
a map that was used by the city of León for as-
sessment and tax purposes in 2002. This map was 
the best framework for sampling, given that mail-
ing addresses are not used in Nicaragua. Sampled 
households were randomly assigned one of the 
four treatments.  
   First, the CV scenario presented the character-
istics of the existing water system, followed by an 
improvement in the water system reliability (no 
interruptions). The water quality varied according 
to the experimental design. Then, the CV question 
asked households to pay a monthly fee for im-
proved water services and confronted respondents 
with their budget constraint. Finally, respondents 
were asked to vote for or against the project. The 
referendum voting question presented in the sur-
vey is as follows: 
 
Keep in mind that current service of tap 
water in León is commonly interrupted. 
Suppose that León residents will have the 
opportunity to vote for or against a 
project that would improve the current 
drinking water system. With the new 
system, your household would have tap 
water 24 hours per day, every day of the 
year. 
  
Current Quality:  [The water quality 
would remain the same.]  
 
Improved Quality: [In addition, the new 
system would treat water to make it 
totally safe to drink.]  
 
The new system would continue being 
administered by ENACAL in a global 
way. If the project is approved, your 
household  would  pay a total  of  $FEE  188  August 2011                                                                                                         Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
 
 
Table 1. Split-Sample Experimental Design 
  s e t u b i r t t A   e d o M   y e v r u S
Reliable system with existing 
(unsafe) water quality 
Reliable system and provision of 
safe drinking water 
Total 
Unsupervised 
[local surveyor alone] 
n =158 
Average fee = 376.90 
n = 155 
Average fee = 348.06 
n = 313 
Average fee = 362.62 
Supervised 
[local surveyor +  
foreign supervisor] 
n =153 
Average fee = 376.14 
n =142 
Average fee = 379.93 
n = 295 
Average fee = 377.97 
Total  n = 311 
Average fee = 376.53 
n = 297 
Average fee = 363.30 
n = 608 
Average fee = 370.07 
Notes: Average fee is expressed in Nicaraguan currency, the Cordoba (1 US$ is equivalent to approximately 20.87 Cordobas as  
of June 2009). 
 
 
per  month  for  water  services.  Keep  in 
mind that $FEE per month spent on the 
improved  drinking  water  services  will 
not be available to purchase food, cloth-
ing,  and  other  items  needed  in  your 
household. 
  
Would You Vote For or Against the 
Project?  
 
___In favor of the project 
 
___Against the project 
 
A  follow-up  question  about  the  certainty  of  re-
sponses  was  included  to  estimate  WTP  for  im-
proved water services. Blumenschein et al. (2008) 
and Champ, Moore, and Bishop (2009) argue that 
this approach can be used to correct ex post for 
the  possible  existence  of  hypothetical  bias.  A 
number  of  recent  studies  show  that  recoding 
“Yes” responses based on the condition of at least 
a 7 (on a scale of 0-10) is required to mitigate hy-
pothetical bias (Groothius, Groothius, and White-
head  2007,  Morrison  and  Brown  2009,  Poe, 
Girard, and Loomis 2002, Whitehead and Cherry 
2007).  Thus,  respondents  were  asked  about  the 
certainty of their voting responses on the dichot-
omous  CV  question  using  a  scale  from  zero  to 
100 (where zero meant completely uncertain and 
100 completely certain) as follows: 
 
On a scale of 0 to 100, where 100 means 
completely certain, and 0 is completely 
uncertain,  how  sure  are  you  of  the 
answer  you  just  gave  to  the  voting 
question?   
 
______ / 0-100 
 
 
Similar follow-up certainty questions using 0-10 
or  0-100  scales,  or  categorical  scales  (ranging 
from  definitely  unsure  to  definitely  sure)  have 
been  widely  used  in  recent  CV  studies  (see 





A utility-theoretic framework was used to model 
individual  preferences  for  water  services,  in 
which V(Y, W, P, Z) represents the indirect utility 
function  of  a  household  that  increases  with  in-
come (Y) and positive attributes of water services 
(W),  including  system  reliability  and  water 
quality. In contrast, indirect utility (V) decreases 
with prices of other goods (P) and also depends Franceschi and Vásquez                                                                          Do Supervisors Affect the Valuation of Public Goods?  189 
 
on relevant household characteristics (Z). This 
framework predicts that a household will be will-
ing to pay for improvements of water services up 
to the extent that this payment does not decrease 




(1) V(Y, P, W0,Z )  =  V ( Y - W T P A,P ,W A,Z )
  = V(Y-WTPB,P ,W B,Z )  
 
where W0 represents the current provision of wa-
ter services, and WA represents the improved wa-
ter service under the proposed referendum (i.e., 
uninterrupted water services). WTPA represents 
the maximum willingness to pay for 24-hours-
per-day provision of water services every day of 
the year. WB represents a further improvement of 
water services, which include providing better 
quality of water in addition to uninterrupted water 
services (i.e., WA ⊂ WB). Therefore, a household’s 
WTP for improved WB is expected to be greater 
than WTP for the basic improvement WA (i.e., 
WTPB > WTPA). This provides a test of scope for 
a nested good (Carson and Mitchell 1995).  
   The willingness to pay for improved water serv-
ices is assumed to follow a log-linear form: 
 
(2)             LnWTP = Xβ + e  
 
where LnWTP stands for the natural logarithm of 
a household’s willingness to pay (WTP) for a 
change in the public water system; X is a vector 
of covariates that includes treatment variables 
(e.g., different scope levels of water services and 
interview supervision), household income and 
other characteristics; β is a vector of coefficients 
to be estimated; and e is the stochastic error term.  
   WTP for proposed water system improvements 
at the household level is not directly observed in 
the referendum data but is indirectly observed. It 
is expected that households will vote in favor of 
the proposed improvement only if LnWTP is 
greater than or equal to the natural logarithm of 
the increased tax or fee (LnFEE) presented to the 
respondent. Otherwise, the respondent is expected 
to vote against the improvement. Let I be an in-
dicator equal to one, if the respondent votes in fa-
vor of the proposed improvement and equal to 
zero if the respondent votes against it. That is, I=1 
if LnWTP>LnFEE, and I=0 otherwise. Given this 
equivalence, the indicator I and the variable 
LnWTP censored by LnFEE have the same 
distribution [i.e., P(I=1) = P(LnWTP>LnFEE)]. 
Cameron (1988) proposed using this equivalence 
to directly estimate WTP models from referen-
dum voting data under the assumption that the 
stochastic error term in equation (2) follows a lo-
gistic distribution. This assumption allows for 
scaling the error term and hence directly estimat-
ing coefficients β even though LnWTP is not ob-
served as follows: 
 
(3)   P(I =1) = P(LnWTP >LnFEE)
      = P(Xβ+e >LnFEE)
  = P(e/K >LnFEE/K - Xβ/K)
 
 
where  K is a scaling parameter of the logistic 
function.
1 Cameron (1988) argued that the β coef-
ficients obtained from the optimization of the cor-
responding log-likelihood function could be in-
terpreted as equivalent to the marginal effects of 
an OLS equation. This paper follows Cameron’s 
(1988) censored logistic regression procedure to 
directly estimate WTP models. 
   The CV method has been shown to be subject to 
upward hypothetical bias. While a referendum 
format has been proposed to minimize hypothet-
ical bias (Arrow et al. 1993, Carson and Groves 
2007), there is not consensus that this format can 
completely eliminate such bias (Little and 
Berrens 2004, Murphy et al. 2005). Blumenschein 
et al. (2008) argued that hypothetical bias may be 
reduced by recoding responses to the referendum 
voting question, based on the certainty of house-
hold responses measured on a scale of 0 to 100, 
where 0 means absolute uncertainty and 100 
means absolute certainty (e.g., Berrens et al. 2002, 
2004). Following Groothius, Groothius, and 
Whitehead (2007), Morrison and Brown (2009), 
and Whitehead and Cherry (2007), the responses 
to the referendum voting question in this study 
are recoded as favorable answers only if the re-
spondent votes in favor of the proposed improve-
ment (I=1) and reports a certainty of response to 
the referendum question above the threshold of 70. 
Otherwise respondents are assumed to be against  
                                                         
1 The parameter K is related to the standard deviation of the error term 
where K= σe√3/π. 190  August 2011                                                                                                         Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
 
 
   Table 2. Variables Definition and Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Definition  Mean  S.D. 
LnFEE  Natural log of the additional fee charged for water improvement presented to 
respondents in the CV survey  
5.82 0.46 
QUALITY  Quality of the tap water to be provided (1=safe drinking water;  
0=maintaining the current water quality) 
0.49 0.50 
SUPERVISED If  the  interview  was  supervised (1=Yes, 0=Otherwise)  0.49  0.50 
INCOME  Household’s income grouping, in Nicaraguan Cordobas (0=no income,  
1=less than 1000, 2=1001 to 2000, 3=2001 to 3000, 4=3001 to 4000,  
5=4001 to 5000, 6=5001 to 6000, 7=6001 to 7000, 8=7001 to 8000,  
9=8001 to 9000, 10=9001 to 10000, 11=more than 10000)  
[1 US$ = 20.87 C$] 
4.07 3.15 
EDUC  Respondent’s education (in years of schooling)  10.00  4.84 
 HOURSATIS  Subjective perception of the number of hours of water supply on a 5 point scale 




If the household currently consumes bottled water on a regular basis (1=Yes, 
0=Otherwise) 
0.37 0.48 
AGE  Age of respondent (in years)  43.95  17.78 
OWN  If the respondent household is owner of the house (1=Yes, 0=Otherwise)  0.87  0.34 
POTENTIAL  If the respondent thought that the proposed project could be implemented in 
León (1=Yes, 0=Otherwise) 
0.68 0.47 
INTEREST  If the respondent showed any interest by asking any question regarding the 
implementation of the new water system during the interview (1=Yes, 
0=Otherwise) 
0.38 0.49 
 LISTENING  If there was anyone else (other adult household member) with the respondent 




the proposed improvement. The recoded indicator 
is then used to estimate WTP models through 
Cameron’s (1988) censored logistic regression 
procedure. This approach provides more con-
servative and presumably realistic estimates of 
the household’s WTP (Blumenschein et al. 2008, 
Vossler et al. 2003). 
 
Variables and Hypotheses 
 
Table 2 presents the definitions and descriptive 
statistics of the variables used in the analysis. The 
dummy variable QUALITY is used to estimate the 
effect of the change in the scope of water system 
services through the absence or presence of water 
treatment to purify drinking water, combined with 
the improvement in system reliability. The varia-
ble SUPERVISED is included to observe individ-
uals’ responses to the presence of a supervisor in 
the interview. The variable HOURSATIS is in-
cluded to measure the effect of households’ per-
ception about the current water system reliability 
on WTP for safe drinking water. The effects of 
the household’s averting behavior are estimated 
by including the variable BOTTLEWAT. The 
respondents’ characteristics include AGE, 
INCOME, EDUC, OWN, and some other relevant 
variables. Specifically, the variable INTEREST is 
included to gauge the household’s interest in the 
proposed water project. The variable LISTENING 
is used to capture the potential social contexts 
(List et al. 2004). The variable POTENTIAL is an 
indicator of whether sampled households believe 
that the project is feasible.    Franceschi and Vásquez                                                                          Do Supervisors Affect the Valuation of Public Goods?  191 
 
 
Table 3. Average Profile of Respondents 
Description Mean      S.D. 
Age of the respondent (in years)  43.95  17.78 
Number of schooling years of the respondent  10.00  4.84 
Number of adult males in the household (>15 years)  1.69  1.29 
Number of adult females in the household (>15 years)  2.17  2.25 
Number of children in the household (<15 years)  1.24  1.33 
Percentage of female respondents  66.28%  57.31% 
Monthly household income (in Cordobas)  3614.31  3096.02 
Number of rooms in the housing unit  2.72  1.47 
Percentage of households who own the housing unit  86.68%  34.01% 
 
 
In addition to estimating WTP of a represent-
tative household, we also test a number of specif-
ic hypotheses (against the null of no effects). The 
first hypothesis (H1:βQUALITY >0) posits that house-
hold WTP for safe drinking water increases with 
improvements in water quality. Given that the 
split-sample treatment is designed in terms of 
valuing only an improvement in system reliability 
or valuing an improvement both in system 
reliability and water quality, then this is a test of 
scope of a nested good (Carson and Mitchell 
1995). The split-sample treatment also allows for 
estimating the effect of supervising the interview. 
No previous expectations are held for the super-
vision effect, given that existing theory and 
evidence are very limited. Thus, hypothesis 
H2:βSUPERVISED ≠ 0 states that supervising the in-
terview may have an effect on WTP for a reliable 
water system, but it does not indicate the direction 
of such an effect.  
   As a measure of construct validity, in the theo-
retical framework it is assumed that safe and 
reliable drinking water is a normal good (a pos-
itive income effect on the WTP), as stated in hy-
pothesis H3:βINCOME > 0 (Whitehead 1995). As a 
further measure of construct validity (and the sub-
stitution effect), hypothesis H4:βBOTTLEWAT > 0 im-
plies that households who purchase bottled water 
are expected to report a higher WTP, given that 
the proposed improvement in the water system 
would be expected to provide a less expen- 
sive substitute for bottled water. Hypothesis 
H5:βHOURSATIS < 0 states that households with a 
better perception of the water system reliability 
(HOURSATIS) are expected to report a lower 
WTP since they may perceive a smaller improve-
ment from the current water supply system. 
      We also evaluate a number of more open 
conjectures in hypotheses H6:βPOTENTIAL > 0 and 
H7:βLISTENING < 0. As stated in H6, it is expected 
that households are more likely, ceteris paribus, to 
support a project (vote “Yes” on a referendum) 
when they consider it to be feasible and conse-
quently believe that the survey will ultimately 
impact policy (Herriges et al. 2010). Further, a 
number of studies have found potential upward 
social desirability bias (e.g., List et al. 2004) 
when individuals give valuation responses in 
front of others; however, these usually do not 
involve household members, which instead might  192  August 2011                                                                                                         Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
 
 
Table 4. Averting Behavior of Sampled Households 
Description  Mean S.D. 
Percentage of households with water storage facilities at home  77.14%  42.03% 
Investment and maintenance cost of water storage facilities, annual  245.02  697.84 
Percentage of households who treat tap water at home  25.16%  43.43% 
Percentage of households who boil tap water at home  15.13%  35.86% 
Percentage of households who filter tap water at home  3.29%  17.85% 
Percentage of households who treat tap water at home with chlorine 8.72%  28.23% 
Percentage of households who drink tap water  94.88%  22.05% 
Percentage of households who purchase bottled water   37.13%  48.35% 
Weekly expenses on bottled water (of those households who reported that they buy and 
consume bottled water) 
58.55 91.96 
Monthly expenses on tap water  263.36  243.19 
Notes: Maintenance cost, expenses on bottled water, and expenses on tap water are expressed in Nicaraguan currency, Cordoba  
(1 US$ = 20.87 C$). 
 
 
be expected to be a check on any yea-saying be-
havior. Thus, H7 holds that WTP will be lower 




Table 3 shows the average profile of respondents 
and their households. As the surveys were 
implemented predominantly during the daytime 
hours, most of the respondents were females 
(66.28 percent), with an average age of about 44 
years and 10 years of schooling. On average, 5 
people live in each household, with more than 2 
adult females, about 1.7 adult males, and slightly 
above 1 child. Almost 87 percent of the respond-
ents own their homes (with an average of 2.72 
rooms). Respondents reported an average month-
ly household income of 3,614.31 Cordobas (US 
$173.418).  
   León’s inhabitants have adopted several water 
practices to cope with unreliable water services. 
In the last year, more than 77 percent of sampled 
households invested an average of 245.02 
Cordobas in water storage facilities (see Table 4). 
While almost 95 percent of respondents report 
that they drink tap water, more than 25 percent 
treat tap water at home. The most popular treat-
ment is boiling tap water, followed by treating tap 
water with chlorine, and then water filtering. 
These indicators suggest that the quality of water 
is unsatisfactory for drinking purposes. Along the 
same line, more than 37 percent of sampled 
households spend 58.55 Cordobas per week on 
bottled water, which accounts for about 6.5 per-
cent of the average income. If spending on stor-
age facilities and bottled water is added to a mon-
thly average of 263.36 Cordobas spent on tap 
water, an average household may spend as much 
as 14.8 percent of the average monthly income on 
water (535.54 Cordobas). This expenditure on 
water seems to be high, particularly in a devel-
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Table 5 shows six WTP models estimated using 
individuals’ responses to the referendum and cer-
tainty questions presented in the section Survey 
Design and Supervision Procedure. Models 1, 2, 
and 3 are based on the raw responses to the refer-
endum question. Model 1 is estimated using the 
pooled sample. Models 2 and 3 are estimated us-
ing the subsamples of supervised and unsuper-
vised interviews, respectively. Models 4, 5, and 6 
are estimated using the referendum responses 
corrected for a 70 percent certainty level or above 
to mitigate potential hypothetical bias (Morrison 
and Brown 2009, Whitehead and Cherry 2007). 
These models (4, 5, and 6) are also estimated 
using the pooled, supervised, and unsupervised 
samples, respectively. Since Cameron’s (1988) 
approach is used to estimate all models, estimated 
coefficients are interpreted as semi-elasticities of 
WTP with respect to the associated variable (i.e., 
βX = ∂ LnWTP/∂X). In terms of the signs and sig-
nificance of the explanatory variables, the results 
in Table 5 show a considerable degree of robust-
ness across six models. 
   In support of hypothesis H1, the estimated coef-
ficients on QUALITY are positive and statistically 
significant for the pooled-sample and supervised-
sample models (see Models 1, 2, 4, and 5). This 
result shows evidence of sensitivity to scope for a 
nested good (Carson and Mitchell 1995). That is, 
individuals are willing to pay more for a reliable 
system that provides safe drinking water than for 
tap water with the current quality. Similar results 
are found by Vásquez et al. (2009) in Parral, 
Mexico. However, the estimated coefficients on 
QUALITY are statistically insignificant for WTP 
models estimated using the unsupervised sample. 
This may raise the question about a potential 
structural change in coefficients between super-
vised and unsupervised samples. Likelihood-ratio 
tests rule out this possibility for models based on 
the raw voting data (χ
2=17.61), indicating that su-
pervised and unsupervised samples can be pooled, 
but they suggest a structural change in the coef-
ficients when voting data is corrected for 70 per-
cent of certainty (χ
2=21.47) based on a 5 percent 
significance level test. These results provide am-
biguous evidence against hypothesis H2. Models 1 
and 4, however, indicate that interview supervi-
sion has no effect on reported WTP, as corre-
sponding coefficients are not statistically signif-
icant in contrast to hypothesis H2. This evidence 
shows an absence of supervisor effect from the 
use of supervisors with interviewers, even if they 
are foreigners, to improve the quality of CV sur-
vey data in developing countries as recommended 
by Gunatilake et al. (2007) and Whittington 
(2002). Results not presented here, but available 
upon request, show that this effect holds for fe-
male and male supervisors, and for all individual 
supervisors but one who is associated with lower 
WTP estimates (only at a 10 percent significance 
level).  
   Consistent with the hypothesis that water is a 
normal economic good (i.e., hypothesis H3) and 
with previous studies in Latin American contexts 
(e.g., Rodríguez, Southgate, and Haab 2009, Soto 
Montes de Oca and Bateman 2006), a household 
with a higher income would pay more for reliable 
water services as shown by the positive and sig-
nificant coefficient of INCOME across all models 
(see Table 5). In contrast, the evidence does not 
appear to support H4, since there is no statistical 
difference between the WTP of households who 
purchase and consume bottled water and house-
holds who do not. This result is in accord with the 
findings of Vásquez et al. (2009) who also report 
insignificant effects of bottled water consumption 
on WTP for improved water services in Mexico, 
but it contradicts the positive and significant im-
pact of monthly expenses for water outside the 
home that Casey, Kahn, and Rivas (2006) found 
in Brazil. Also, in contrast to hypothesis H5, the 
estimated coefficients on HOURSATIS indicate 
that households with a more positive perception 
of the number of hours with water services are not 
willing to pay less than households with a bad 
perception of the service hours. Similarly, Rodrí-
guez, Southgate, and Haab (2009) found no WTP 
differentials between households that experience 
water service interruptions and households with 
no interruptions in the 12 months previous to their 
study in Ecuador. 
      Table 5 also presents evidence in support of 
hypothesis H6. The estimated coefficients on 
POTENTIAL suggest that individuals who believe 
that the project may be implemented in the city of 
León report a higher WTP than individuals who 
do not [see Vásquez et al. (2009) for similar re-
sults in Parral, Mexico]. Respondents who believe 
in the project’s feasibility may also believe that 
the survey will have policy consequences and 
therefore tend to report  higher WTP  (Herriges et  196  August 2011                                                                                                         Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
 
 









Median WTP in 
Relation to Current 
Tap Water 
Expenditure (%) 





Model 1 (Pooled, No Certainty Correction) 
QUALITY=1 397.57  336.10  466.39  198.79%  14.44% 
QUALITY=0 313.90  266.92  363.94  156.95%  11.40% 
Model 2 (Supervised, No Certainty Correction) 
    
QUALITY=1 512.38  363.24  717.09  256.20%  18.61% 
QUALITY=0 303.53  225.40  400.33  151.77%  11.02% 
Model 3 (Unsupervised, No Certainty Correction)       
QUALITY=1 334.44  284.24  388.81  167.22%  12.15% 
QUALITY=0 321.70  269.15  382.65  160.85%  11.68% 
Model 4 (Pooled, 70% Certainty Correction) 
     
QUALITY=1 322.53  267.58  385.12  161.27%  11.71% 
QUALITY=0 222.68  177.37  271.31  111.34%  8.09% 
Model 5 (Supervised, 70% Certainty Correction)      
QUALITY=1 339.55  232.65  502.82  169.78%  12.33% 
QUALITY=0 170.86  92.40  303.21  85.43%  6.20% 
Model 6 (Unsupervised, 70% Certainty Correction) 
    
QUALITY=1 310.42  263.88  364.53  155.21%  11.27% 
QUALITY=0 256.98  213.41  310.35  128.49%  9.33% 
Notes: 95 percent CI is derived using the Krinsky and Robb (1986) procedure (using 5,000 simulations).  
 
 
al. 2010). No evidence was found that indicates 
that the social context in which the interview is 
conducted affects the reported WTP, in contrast 
to hypothesis H7. 
   Other  respondents’  characteristics  such  as 
EDUC, OWN, and FEMALE do not impact   
the WTP for reliable water services. Vásquez et 
al. (2009) also found insignificant effects of edu-
cation and home ownership, and Soto Montes de 
Oca and Bateman (2006) found no difference 
between WTP for male and female respondents. 
Similarly, the interest shown by the respondents 
by asking for the project implementation potential 
has no effect on reported WTP. However, the es-
timated coefficients of AGE suggest that the WTP 
for reliable water services decreases with the re-
spondent’s age in accordance with the findings of 
Casey, Kahn, and Rivas (2006), Soto Montes de 
Oca and Bateman (2006), and Vásquez et al. 
(2009). The estimated coefficient on the scale Franceschi and Vásquez                                                                          Do Supervisors Affect the Valuation of Public Goods?  197 
 
parameter K (the negative of the inverse of the fee 
coefficient in a regular logit model) is positive 
and significant, implying that respondents are 
sensitive to the price (Cameron 1988, Whitehead 
1995).
2 
   Table 6 presents the median WTP for reliable 
water services with corresponding 95 percent con-
fidence intervals, calculated using Krinsky and 
Robb’s (1986) boot-strapping procedure (with 
1,000 simulations), and a comparative perspective 
of WTP estimates in relation to current expend-
itures spent on tap water and also in relation to 
median household income. The median WTP for 
reliable water services estimated using the pooled 
sample (Model 1) is 313.90 Cordobas per month 
if the water quality is maintained at current levels 
and 397.57 Cordobas if the improved system pro-
vides safe drinking water. This estimate accounts 
for more than 150 percent of current median ex-
penditures on tap water, or an increase of more 
than 50 percent in the median water bill, and more 
than 11 percent of median monthly income if cur-
rent quality levels are maintained. The median 
WTP almost doubles the current median expend-
iture on tap water when households are presented 
with a reliable system that provides safe drinking 
water. This median WTP accounts for more than 
14 percent of median monthly household income. 
Similar WTP estimates are obtained when using 
supervised and unsupervised samples if current 
quality levels are maintained. However, when 
households are presented with a reliable system 
that provides safe drinking water, the WTP esti-
mated using the supervised sample is higher than 
the one based on the unsupervised sample, with 
the former reaching about 18.6 percent of the me-
dian household income. This is consistent with 
the (in)significance of QUALITY coefficients for 
the supervised and unsupervised samples pre-
sented in Table 5 (see Models 2 and 3).  
      More conservative (but still significant) esti-
mates are presented by Models 4, 5, and 6, in 
which responses are corrected for 70 percent cer-
tainty. Estimates based on Model 4 indicate that 
the median household is willing to pay at least 
222.68 Cordobas per month, or more than 8 per-
cent of median monthly income, if current quality 
                                                         
2 Results reported in Table 5 are robust across different model spec-
ifications not reported here but available upon request. For instance, 
averting behavior variables other than tap water (e.g., households that 
treat tap water at home and that have storage facilities) were included 
in model estimations. Results showed that those variables are sta-
tistically insignificant and that reported findings are unchanged. 
levels are maintained. That is equivalent to an in-
crease of at least 11.34 percent in current water 
bills. If the improved system provides safe drink-
ing water, the median WTP is 310.42–339.55 
Cordobas (depending on the model), which corre-
sponds to an increase of more than 55 percent in 
water bills. That is, households are willing to pay 
more than 11 percent of the median monthly 
household income.
3  As a point of comparison, 
Vásquez et al. (2009) report that households in 
Parral, Mexico are willing to pay as much as 11.5 
percent of their income for reliable and safe 
drinking water. Soto Montes de Oca and Bateman 
(2006) note that earlier CV studies conducted in 
urban communities in Asian and African coun-
tries report a willingness to pay for an improved 
water supply system of 50 percent to 340 percent 
of the existing water bills. WTP estimates pre-
sented in this paper for León, Nicaragua appear to 
lie in the lower half of that range. 
      WTP estimates are compared through formal 
tests based on a complete combinatorial approach 
suggested by Poe, Girard, and Loomis (2005) to 
further investigate the effects of interview super-
vision (see Table 7). Poe, Girard, and Loomis 
(2005) show that probabilities calculated through 
combinatorial approaches are analogous to con-
ventional p values for hypothesis testing. The un-
derlying distributions generating uncorrected me-
dian WTPs are similar if current quality levels are 
maintained. However, if safe drinking water is 
provided, uncorrected median WTP distributions 
seem to be different, with both the pooled and su-
pervised samples generating higher estimates than 
the unsupervised samples (significant at 10 
percent and 5 percent levels, respectively). This  
is expected, as the estimated coefficient on 
QUALITY is significant for the pooled and su-
pervised samples, but statistically insignificant for 
the unsupervised sample. As mentioned above, 
likelihood-ratio tests rule out the possibility of 
structural changes in coefficients across super-
vised and unsupervised samples when voting re-
sponses are not corrected for (un)certainty. Dis-
tributions  of  WTP  corrected for 70  percent cer-  
                                                         
3 Even more conservative estimates are obtained when voting re-
sponses are corrected for 80 percent and 90 percent certainty. If the pre-
sented system provides safe drinking water, estimates corrected for 80 
percent and 90 percent certainty suggest that households would pay 
258.75 and 195.29 Cordobas, respectively. If the current quality level is 
maintained, the WTP estimated is 183.18 Cordobas for 80 percent 
certainty correction, and 116.67 Cordobas for 90 percent certainty 
correction.  198  August 2011                                                                                                         Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
 
 
Table 7. Tests of Median WTP Differences 
  Probabilities of significant 
differences in median WTP: 
QUALITY=1 
Probabilities of significant 
differences in median WTP: 
QUALITY=0 
No Certainty Correction     
P(WTPpooled > WTPunsupervised)  0.929 0.416 
P(WTPpooled > WTPsupervised)  0.101 0.585 
P(WTPsupervised > WTPunsupervised)  0.987 0.362 
Corrected for 70% certainty     
P(WTPpooled > WTPunsupervised)  0.612 0.156 
P(WTPpooled > WTPsupervised)  0.427 0.801 
P(WTPsupervised > WTPunsupervised)  0.635 0.097 
 
 
tainty are similar, with the exception of the WTP 
distribution from the unsupervised sample, which 
generates higher WTP estimates than the super-
vised sample (at a 10 percent significance level) if 




Findings indicate that there is a latent demand for 
improved water services as households adopt dif-
ferent practices to cope with current, unreliable 
water services. Conservative estimates requiring 
at least a 70 percent certainty level on responses 
indicate that households are willing to pay an in-
crease of at least 11 percent in their current water 
bills for uninterrupted water services. That in-
crease can be as high as 60 percent over monthly 
water bills when a minimum level of certainty is 
not required. In total, households would be will-
ing to pay 6.2 percent to 11.7 percent of the re-
ported median household income for uninter-
rupted water services, which is above a suggested 
affordability threshold of 3 percent of household 
income (OECD 2003). Results show scope sensi-
tivity in reported WTP, which serves as a test for 
validation of CV studies (Arrow et al. 1993, Soto 
Montes de Oca and Bateman 2006). According to 
conservative estimates, households are willing to 
pay at least an increase of 55 percent in the water 
bill when the system proposes to treat water to 
safe levels, in addition to providing uninterrupted 
water services. In total, households would pay at 
least 11 percent of their income, which is consist-
ent with the average water expenditure of house-
holds investing in storage facilities and purchas-
ing bottled water (about 14.8 percent of the aver-
age monthly income). As a further test for validity, 
results indicate that WTP for improved water 
services is positively related to income, and the 
probability of voting for the improved system is 
negatively associated with the level of the pro-
posed fee (Whitehead 1995).  
   The focus of this study is on the effects that in-
terview supervision may have on reported will-
ingness to pay for improved water services in a 
developing country context. This is an issue that 
has received little attention in the CV literature 
even though there is extensive evidence that CV 
studies can be affected by social desirability bias, 
interviewer effects, and social isolation issues 
(Laughland, Musser, and Musser 1994, Legget et 
al. 2003, List et al. 2004, Loureiro and Lotade 
2005). Results suggest that the presence of super-
visors in the interview do not affect the WTP Franceschi and Vásquez                                                                          Do Supervisors Affect the Valuation of Public Goods?  199 
 
estimates. That is true even when foreign individ-
uals who do not speak the local language fluently 
or understand the local culture fully are used as 
supervisors. Thus, this analysis has a method-
logical implication: supervisors can be used to en-
hance the quality of CV data collection, as recom-
mended by Gunatilake et al. (2007) and Whit-
tington (2002). That is, foreign supervisors may 
assess the quality of interviews, review completed 
questionnaires before leaving the location, and 
ensure that the intended sample is interviewed.  
   We hope that the results from this study help 
stimulate further investigation regarding supervi-
sion effects on CV outcomes. Logical extensions 
would be to assess supervision effects in stated 
preference methods other than the referendum 
elicitation format (e.g., open-ended question and 
choice experiments), as the latter has proved to 
reduce other types of issues such as hypothetical 
bias (Murphy et al. 2005). It is also important to 
analyze supervision effects in the valuation of 
other goods, given that social desirability bias 
seems to vary across different products and ser-
vices (Loureiro and Lotade 2005). While the evi-
dence presented here cannot be deemed conclu-
sive, it suggests that supervising may help im-
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